Electoral fraud has become an integral part of electoral competition both in established democracies and less-than-democratic regimes. In this paper I study electoral fraud in the non-democratic setting. First, I present evidence of fraud sustainability and growth over the lifetime of non-democratic regimes in post-Soviet and Sub-Saharan countries. Second, I provide a theoretical model that explains the observed tendency of growing fraud. Specifically, in a probabilistic voting model of electoral competition with falsifications, a corrupt incumbent faces two types of uncertainty: uncertainty about voters' attitude towards fraud and uncertainty about his true support, captured by a purely random component in the voters' utility over candidates. The model predicts that when uncertainty is sufficiently large, higher uncertainty about voters' fraud intolerance provides weaker incentives to commit fraud. Over time the incumbent becomes more certain about voters' reaction to fraud because of learning through Bayesian updating and, thus, as the deterrent role of fraud intolerance uncertainty declines, the incentives to commit fraud become stronger, providing a growing fraud profile.
Introduction
Fair elections are fundamental to democracy. Over the last decades researchers mainly assumed that elections are well-functioning tools for converting public preferences into social choice. However, in reality, cases of manipulating electoral outcomes are quite widespread 1 even in established democracies. In less-than-democratic regimes, strategies to shape electoral results through political pressure and especially electoral fraud 2 are an integral part of political competition. International organizations exert tremendous effort to ensure transparency in elections. However, electoral fraud in nondemocracies 3 seems to be not only persistent, but expanding.
All the main findings on electoral fraud are derived from the analysis of particular elections in a given country at a given moment (Lehoucq, 2003) , while the issues of fraud dynamics get limited attention in academic literature. This is surprising, because studying the evolution of fraud seems to be extremely important from many different perspectives. Comprehensively studying political regimes, designing effective electoral legislation and, especially, assessing the effectiveness of electoral monitoring are much harder to do without an understanding of fraud dynamics. To assess the effect of an electoral reform on the integrity of elections or to study the role of international monitoring in improving electoral transparency, one has to understand how the electoral 3 environment changes over time and what are the sources of those changes. For such purposes, studying fraud dynamics is crucial.
One reason why electoral fraud suffers from a relative lack of attention in the academic literature is the absence of a reliable measure of fraud. The inability to measure fraud in a consistent way precludes implementing reliable empirical research on fraud dynamics, which in turn discourages efforts towards a theoretical study of electoral fraud, as it is hard to test any theory in this field. As a result, a set of important questions including the question of increasing fraud as well as reasons and conditions for fraud occurrence still call for an explanation. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap by studying the role of uncertainty in fraud dynamics.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. Firstly, I discuss evidence suggesting a tendency of increasing electoral fraud in Post-Soviet and Sub-Saharan non-democratic countries. Secondly, I present a game-theoretical probabilistic voting model with fraud which rationalizes the observed tendency, suggesting evolution of uncertainty about voters' attitude towards fraud as a potential explanation for growing fraud. In particular, a model of electoral competition with falsifications explicitly distinguishes between two types of uncertainty that affect electoral outcomes: aggregate uncertainty about true support, captured by a purely random component in voters' utility over candidates, and the incumbent's uncertainty about voters' fraud intolerance, represented by his subjective beliefs about the attitude of the voters towards fraud. These two uncertainties prevent the incumbent's learning about voters' fraud tolerance immediately after the first elections, providing him with a noisy signal about voters' true attitude towards fraud, which is used for Bayesian updating of the incumbent's beliefs. The model 4 predicts that when there is large initial uncertainty on the incumbent's side, uncertainty about voters' attitude towards fraud negatively affects incentives to commit fraud. Over time this uncertainty decreases because of learning and, thus, provides the incumbent with greater incentives to commit fraud.
One can doubt the significance of uncertainty in explaining increasing electoral fraud, suggesting a number of obvious reasons for the observed tendency like growing stakes of re-election and decreasing costs of fraud because of learning by doing (see for instance Simpser, 2008) . However, costs and stakes determine the level of committed fraud only if there is uncertainty about the outcome of the elections. In this paper I focus on the pure effect of uncertainty and show that it can also provide incentives for increasing fraud. Furthermore, in contrast to conventional wisdom (e.g., Simpser, 2008) I demonstrate that uncertainty does not always increase the incentives to commit fraud, and the direction of the effect depends on the nature of the uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I review the existing literature on the issues of electoral manipulations and, particularly, electoral fraud. I then discuss problems of measuring electoral fraud and provide some evidence from Post-Soviet and Sub-Saharan countries, suggesting that electoral fraud has been growing over time.
Further, I develop a formal game-theoretic dynamic model of elections with falsifications and show how uncertainty could lead to increasing fraud. attempts to rationalize such behavior by formalizing the idea that excessive fraud can, first, deter future opposition coordination and turnout and, second, directly influence the beliefs of opposition supporters that elections will be corrupt and thus prevent their turnout. In a later paper, Simpser (2008) elaborates on this idea and comes up with a model that generates equilibrium with persistent but not growing excessive fraud. Also, the author briefly discusses the potential role of exogenous uncertainty, costs and stakes in his explanation of excessive fraud but concludes that these features cannot sufficiently explain the high victory margins observed in the data. However, the equilibrium outcome and the latter conclusion come from strict underlying assumptions, particularly, the assumption that opposition supporters, in the case of the incumbent's victory, get more utility when they abstain from voting than when they do vote (i.e. opposition supporters but not incumbent's supporters are discouraged from participating in the elections if the incumbent is very likely to win, which is a disputable assumption). To credibly analyze the evolution of electoral fraud, one needs to have some objective measure of fraud. Lehoucq (2003) suggests several types of sources that can provide valuable information for building such a measure: press, opposition parties' archives with official acquisitions on fraud, complaints submitted to courts, scientific surveys and interviews with voters, and results of international electoral monitoring. However, all of these sources, except probably the last one, could be biased towards one or Given that electoral fraud is a phenomenon which is hard to measure directly, the only way to assess fraud dynamics is to explore some indirect evidence. Using a methodology similar to Myagkov and Ordeshook (2008) The main advantage of the discussed methodology is that it allows for the detection of electoral fraud based just on official election data. However, two main problems have to be mentioned. First, it is difficult (even impossible for the majority of African elections in the 1990s) to obtain such detailed data for all elections of interest. Second, electoral fraud is a comprehensive process (Carothers, 1997) , while the method detects mainly ballot stuffing and, thus, may underestimate the magnitude of fraud. Thus, one needs to adjust the evaluation of "technical" fraud by some measure of pre-election activity that directly affects election results. The main part of such activity consists of, for instance, controlling the media and pressuring the opposition (Schedler, 2002 , Enikopolov et al, 2009 ). Hence, indexes of media and political freedom could be used as a proxy for preelection manipulations. countries there is a switch from "not fraudulent" to "fraudulent", and only in 4 -vice versa.
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Further, evolution of the victory margin 10 could also provide some information about fraud given that fraudulent elections are strongly associated with high victory margins (Simpser, 2005 (Simpser, , 2008 . Victory margins in the elections of interest are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3 All the voters dislike fraud in the same way. Voter ˩ has utility from fraud ˦, ˢ {˦{ . ˦ where {Ŵ ŵ{ is an "intolerance" parameter that captures voters' attitude towards fraud. Parameter has a true value, which is, however, unknown to the incumbent. Yet, the incumbent has prior beliefs about its value: ŋ˚{ " $ {. Thus, the intolerancs parameter is subject to uncertainty, which I refer to as "fraud intolerance" uncertainty.
Challenger has no opportunity to commit fraud.
The elections are modeled in a modified version of the standard probabilistic voting framework (presented for the first time in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , later used in Persson and Tabellini (2000) and more recently in Gregory et al (2006) Also, I{ŵ{ and I È {ŵ{ are assumed to be relatively large numbers to guarantee that falsifying 100% of the votes is extremely costly.
The incumbent chooses the level of fraud to maximize his expected benefits.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The incumbent chooses the level of fraud ˦ {Ŵ ŵ{.
2. The voters anticipate ˦, the elections take place, the results are adjusted by the level of fraud and are announced, and the winner takes office. Note that correct anticipation of the fraud level by voters is possible only under the assumption of no private information on the side of the incumbent. This means that to anticipate the level of fraud correctly, the voters must know preferences, costs and benefits of fraud as well as the incumbent's beliefs. If one considers this assumption to be too strict, it can be assumed that fraud is fully observable by voters. The latter assumption is not as strict as it seems from first sight because fraud, as discussed above, is a comprehensive process including controlling media and threatening the opposition that mainly takes place before elections, which is well observed by voters. With any of these two assumptions the following analysis is valid.
One Period Analysis
I start with the analysis of a one-period model. For any given level of fraud ˦, voter ˩ votes for the incumbent if ˢ{˦{ --2 Ŵ . ˦ --2 Ŵ 2 ˦ .
Then, the probability that a randomly picked voter votes for the incumbent is This is exactly equal to the true share of votes cast for the incumbent for a given realization of as there is a continuum of voters of measure 1:
Note that if elections are fully free, i.e., there is no fraud, in expectation each candidate gets exactly one half of the votes.
Given the fraud level, the probability that the incumbent wins the elections under the majority rule is then does not make sense because it hurts the incumbent in terms of votes. This can happen when people strongly dislike fraud (e.g., is relatively high), or when there is little heterogeneity among the electorate in terms of ideology ( is high). In the latter case, by committing fraud, which is disliked by everyone, the incumbent loses a relatively large number of his ideological supporters (those with 2 Ŵ) as he is ideologically too close to the challenger who does not commit any fraud. Thus, the condition " . # Ŵ guarantees that in expectation committing fraud makes sense, i.e., it provides incumbent with a higher official vote share than he would get without committing fraud.
The second condition (sufficiently large uncertainty) guarantees that the left-hand side of the first-order condition (1) intersects the marginal cost function at a point between 0 and 1. It is not binding for any reasonable parameter values mainly because marginal cost at ˦ ŵ is a relatively large number under the assumption that stealing 100% of the votes is extremely costly.
Multi-Period Setup
Сonsider a multi-period setup where we have a sequence of elections. Once the results of the first-period elections are announced, the incumbent updates his beliefs.
Specifically, in the end of period ŵ he observes his vote share:
Because Because is drawn from zero-mean normal distribution ˚{Ŵ $ {, signal ˭ is also distributed normally: ˭ # ŋ˚Ә ә. Given the distribution of the signal and priors ŋ˚{ " $ {, the updated distribution of is É˭ # ŋ˚Ә ә.
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It is important to note that fraud in the first period affects the beliefs about in the second period. Specifically, the variance of the beliefs is lower if the first period fraud is higher. Also, note that if there is no fraud in the first period, the beliefs about do not change: when there is no fraud, there is no way to learn anything about voters' response to it.
Given the updated beliefs, in period 2 the incumbent solves
Note that $ is again drawn from the same commonly known distribution ˚{Ŵ $ {
independently from the first-period draw. Later, I will explore the case when follows a random walk and show that the results do not substantially differ from the case with independent draws. However, random walk generates an undesirable effect (to be discussed further) that can contribute to a growing fraud profile and cannot be distinguished from the uncertainty effect. The independent draw assumption eliminates this effect, allowing us to study purely the role of uncertainty in fraud dynamics.
The second period first-order condition takes the following form:
where ˧ {˴{ Thus, beliefs are the only thing that affects the optimal choice of fraud. For clarity, let us separate the effect of changes in beliefs on the "mean effect" and the "variance effect", i.e., changes in optimal fraud between two periods in response to changes in the mean and variance of beliefs, respectively. Further note that variance of the beliefs in the second period is always lower for any ˦ # :
$ .
The following proposition answers the question how this decrease affects the optimal level of fraud.
Proposition 2: Optimal fraud is decreasing in
Proposition 2 says that when there is sufficiently large uncertainty (no matter of what type) an increase in fraud intolerance uncertainty leads to lower equilibrium level of fraud. Note that there are two opposite effects of uncertainty on committing fraud. On the one hand, the incumbent is afraid of committing too much fraud when he has doubts on how voters react to falsification as the intolerance parameter could easily appear to be high enough to make fraud hurting instead of benefiting (see Proposition 1). On the 22 other hand, higher uncertainty implies that investment in fraud becomes less efficient.
According to Proposition 2, when uncertainty is relatively high the first effect dominates. Finally, note that the condition is sufficient, meaning that the optimal fraud is decreasing in subjective uncertainty under even less strict circumstances.
Thus, more precise beliefs under sufficiently large uncertainty provide incentives to commit higher fraud, implying that the "variance effect" pushes the optimal fraud up.
The next question is the direction of the "mean effect". To answer it one first needs to know how changes in the mean of beliefs affect the optimal fraud.
This result, when optimal fraud is not always decreasing in the expected voter's intolerance, could seem counterintuitive. To understand it note that higher fraud intolerance should decrease incentives to commit fraud because with higher value of " , keeping the variance $ fixed, the probability that true will appear to be high enough to make fraud electorally detrimental to the incumbent instead of beneficial (see Proposition 1) is now higher. But according to Proposition 2, increased uncertainty about fraud intolerance decreases incentives to commit fraud only when the uncertainty is sufficiently high. Thus, an increase in " induces lower fraud only when uncertainty is relatively high.
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The second period mean is higher than " if ˭ # 2 " , and
and $ is high enough, the "mean" effect pushes the optimal level of fraud up as well as the "variance" effect, resulting in unambiguously increasing fraud over two periods. If ˭ # 2 " , the updated mean is higher than the prior mean ( " ). In this case the "mean" and the "variance" effects influence optimal fraud in opposite ways, and the resulting direction depends on the values of the model parameters and the realized value of the signal. Specifically, the higher the signal, the more likely the "mean" effect dominates the "variance" effect, implying a decrease in fraud. Thus, there is a threshold value for signal ˭ # such that if ˭ # 2 ˭ # then the second period optimal fraud is lower than the first one; if ˭ # 3 ˭ # then the optimal fraud increases between the two periods and ˭ # 2 " .
Because ˭ # is distributed symmetrically around the true , realization of the signal is more likely to be below the threshold value ˭ # implying that it is more likely to observe increasing fraud rather than decreasing, if prior beliefs are unbiased ( " ).
The likelihood increases if the incumbent overestimates ( " 2 ).
The analysis could be easily extended to the case of a multiple period game under the assumption of a myopic incumbent. Here, myopia means that the incumbent does not invest in learning by strategic committing excessive fraud. Fully rational incumbent could have incentives to choose relatively more fraud in the first period bearing some extra risk and extra costs in exchange for faster learning the true value of . However, 24 the assumption of a fully rational incumbent seems exaggerated, taking into account some features of the real-life electoral environment, where, for example, the length of electoral cycles is rarely less than 4-6 years, which is probably too long to assume strategic fraud commitment.
The crucial thing for the results of the multi period analysis is the conditions stated in Propositions 2 and 3. The analysis is indeed valid only if the conditions hold over time.
Note that both conditions require $ and $ to be sufficiently large, $ is decreasing over time due to learning and $ is constant over time. Thus, eventually the conditions break down. However, the higher $ and the initial value of $ , the later the break occurs, allowing the analysis to be valid for sufficiently large number of periods.
The following section presents the results of the simulation of the multi-period model.
Simulation of the Multi-Period Model
The Indeed, random walk for aggregate uncertainty seems to be more realistic than independent draws. However, the growing fraud profile in this case could be a result of two effects: in addition to the effect of learning about fraud tolerance, there is also an effect of aggregate uncertainty. In contrast to the benchmark case where the aggregate uncertainty was constant over time, it is growing due to the random walk process. As a result, incentives to commit higher fraud over time are increased not only by more precise beliefs about , but also by higher aggregate uncertainty about electoral support.
Thus, for the benchmark case the assumption on independent draws for the aggregate 28 uncertainty component allows for distinguishing two uncertainty time effects and, thus, seems more plausible for the purposes of the paper.
To summarize, the model simulation results in a consistent growing fraud profile which is robust to parameter choice and underlying law of motion for aggregate electoral uncertainty. When uncertainty is sufficiently large, incentives to commit fraud increase when an incumbent's uncertainty about decreases. Over time an incumbent's beliefs about becomes more precise because of learning and, thus, the deterrent role of uncertainty about fraud intolerance declines, implying that the incentives to commit fraud become stronger, leading to a growing profile.
An important observation is that fraud generally grows at a decreasing rate, which is a result of fast learning that mainly takes place in early periods. To clearly illustrate the speed of information gathering, in Figure 7 , I represent the evolution of uncertainty for the three parameters sets already used above. One can notice that the standard deviation of subjective beliefs rapidly decreases in the few first periods. 
